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1. Introduction 
In the middle nineties two American scientists – Steven Brams and Alan Taylor – suggested a fresh 
approach to widespread conflict situations. In these situations conflict consists of a family of separate 
disputable items (partial conflicts), and conflict resolution can be reduced to agreements about each of 
them. The main idea can be roughly presented as follows. Participants have their own values of 
importance of different items that form together a conflict. Because in most cases these values do not 
coincide completely, it is possible to achieve conflict resolution, such that both participants receive 
more than 50% of satisfaction measured in their own values.  
 
1.1. Examples 
The approach is carefully exposed in very comprehensive books [1, 2]. In order to clarify the approach 
two examples taken from [2] are considered here. Many other examples of real and hypothetical 
conflicts illustrating wide applicability of the approach can be found in the above mentioned books.   
Example 1. Divorse arrangement. Ann and Ben are getting a divorce. The items that Bob and Carol 
had to divide were as follows: 
A retirement account (pension), which, though substantial, will remain untouchable for several 
years; they are valuable for both but especially for Ann because Ben has more chance to make 
new account before his retirement. 
A four-bedroom house, located close to Ben’s job; therefore Ben values this house higher than 
Ann. 
Country cottage that can be used at any season, preferable by Ann who intends to live there.  
A portfolio of investments, which has lower monetary value than the pension but is all liquid 
assets. 
Other, consisting of two cars and relatively expensive yacht highly valued by Ben.  
In more detail the situation is described in [2]. Valuations of Ann and Ben of all the considered items 
are given in Table 1.  
                                                                                    Table 1 
Item Ann Ben 
Retirement account  50 40 
House 20 30 
Cottage 15 10 
Portfolio 10 10 
Other 5 10 
Total 100 100 
Giving to everyone entire items, it is possible to suggest the following division: 
For Ann: retirement account + other  = 50 + 5 = 55; 
For Ben: house + cottage + portfolio = 30 + 10 + 10 = 50. 
Thus, satisfaction with this division is not less than half for both participants. The exact notion of 
optimal or fair division, suggested by Brams and Taylor, will be considered further.  
Example 2. Mergers. Disagreements between businesses are common, especially when companies 
merge or are acquired. If each company cares more about different parts of an agreement, complex 
arrangements need to be worked out to satisfy both sides. One of the most elusive ingredients in the 
success of a merger is what deal makers euphemistically refer to as social issues – how power, 
position, and status will be allocated among the merging companies' executives. A failure to resolve 
these issues often leads to the destruction of shareholder wealth and the portrayal of top executives as 
petty corporate titans, unable to subordinate their selfish interests to the goal of promoting shareholder 
well-being. 
Social issues concern the more ineffable matters of status, role, and prestige in the merged company, 
as opposed to "hard" financial factors. Even if a merger is ultimately consummated, as in the case of 
Boeing and McDonnel Douglas, a failure to agree on the resolution of social issues quickly wastes 
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resources and the extremely valuable time of top corporate executives. The difficulty in forging 
cooperation between two management teams is perhaps inevitable, given the transformation that their 
relationship undergoes from the premerger to the post-merger period. After all, former adversaries, 
first in the marketplace and then at the negotiating table, are quite suddenly expected to work closely 
together and cooperate fully as their respective corporate entities attempt to meld into a single 
organization. 
The following social issues are typical for companies’ merger: 
the surviving company's name;  
the location of corporate headquarters;  
the split of the chairman and chief executive officer (CEO) positions; 
and, finally, which side will lay off some of its employees, particularly corporate executives, to 
eliminate overlapping operations or responsibilities (each company would prefer fewer of its 
own layoffs). 
Suppose that the merging companies' executives negotiate over these issues in good faith. Thus, we are 
concerned with truly intractable issues that can be won or lost by either side without undermining the 
merger's objectives. Assume that each side distributes its 100 points across the issues, as follows:  
                                                                                    Table 2 
Conflict items Firm A Firm B 
1. Name 10 25 
2. Headquarters 20 35 
3. President assignment 15 20 
4. CEO assignment 25 10 
5. Laying off  30 10 
Total 100 100 
It is easy to see that in this hypothetical case each side can receive more than a half. For instance, 
For firm A: item 4 + item 5 = 25 + 30 = 55; 
For firm B: item 1 + item 2 + item 3 = 25 + 35 + 20 = 80. 
However, this arrangement does not seem too fair: firm B receives (in its own values) significantly 
more than firm A receives (in its own values). A fair conflict resolution in this case is considered 
further in the article.  
 
1.2. Notion of fair division 
The considered in section 1.1 conflict situations, despite all the differences between them, clear de- 
monstrate two key features, inherent to such kind of conflicts:  
a) conflict consists of several items (goods, issues, etc); 
b) participants have their own values of importance of every item.  
These features form the basis of the above mentioned approach to conflict resolution. The task of 
conflict resolution is reduced to fair division – namely, to fair division of items importance among 
conflict participants correspondingly to their own evaluations. The fairness of division means the 
fulfillment of certain formal conditions:  
1. Proportionality. Every one of participants thinks he or she received a portion that has a size or 
value of at least 50% in his or her own valuation. 
2. Equitability. Each participant thinks that the portion he or she receives is worth the same, in 
terms of his or her valuation, as the portion that the other participant receives in terms of that 
participant's valuation.  
3. Efficiency. A division is efficient (Pareto-optimal) if there is no other division that is strictly 
better for at least one participant and as good for another. 
1.3. Adjusted-winner procedure  
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The authors of book [1] suggested surprisingly simple algorithm of fair division named the adjusted-
winner (AW) procedure. The initial data consist of two sets of natural numbers: a1, …, aN  and b1, …, 
bN  that are valuations of participant A and B  
∑ 𝑎𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1  =  ∑ 𝑏𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1  = 100. 
Let us reorder all the items so that 
a1 ⁄ b1  ≥ a2 ⁄ b2  ≥  ...  ≥ aN ⁄ bN.                                                        (1) 
The AW procedure of fair division can be presented as follows.  
Algorithm 1 (AW procedure). 
1. If a1 > ∑ 𝑏𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=2 , then the 1
st participant receives x-th share of item 1, or xa1, while the 2
nd  participant 
receives (1–x)-th share of item 1 and all the other items 2, …, N, or (1–x)b1+ ∑ 𝑏𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=2 , where 
x = 100 ⁄ (a1 + b1); 
the algorithm is completed. 
2. If  ∑ 𝑎𝑖
𝑁−1
𝑖=1  ≤ bN, then the 1
st participant receives all the items 1, …, N–1 and x-th share of item N, or 
∑ 𝑎𝑖
𝑁−1
𝑖=1  + xaN, while the 2
nd participant receives (1–x)-th share of item N, or (1–x)bN, where  
x = 1 – 100 ⁄ (aN + bN); 
the algorithm is completed. 
3. Starting with 1, increase i up to some value r satisfying conditions  
∑ 𝑎𝑖
𝑟−1
𝑖=1  ≤  ∑ 𝑏𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=𝑟 ,                                                                 (2a) 
∑ 𝑎𝑖
𝑟
𝑖=1  > ∑ 𝑏𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=𝑟+1 .                                                              (2b) 
4. If there is the equality in (2a), then the 1st participant receives items 1, 2, …, r–1, or ∑ 𝑎𝑖
𝑟−1
𝑖=1 , while 
the 2nd participant receives items r, r+1, …, N, or ∑ 𝑏𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=𝑟 ; the algorithm is completed. 
5. If there is the inequality in (2a), then the 1st participant receives items 1, 2, …, r–1 and x-th share of 
item r, or  ∑ 𝑎𝑖
𝑟−1
𝑖=1  + xar, while the 2
nd  participant receives (1–x)-th share of item r and items r+1, …, 
N, or (1–x)br+ ∑ 𝑏𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=𝑟+1 , where 
x = (∑ 𝑏𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=𝑟  –  ∑ 𝑎𝑖
𝑟−1
𝑖=1 ) ⁄ (ar + br); 
the algorithm is completed. 
Theorem 4.1 from book [1] states that a division constructed by this algorithm is a fair division, i.e. it 
possesses properties of proportionality, equitability and efficiency for arbitrary valuations a1,…, aN  
and b1,  …, bN. 
Example 1 (continuation). Let us reorder items from Table 1 so that they satisfy condition (1): 
                                                                                    Table 3 
Item Ann Ben 
1. Cottage 15 10 
2. Retirement account  50 40 
3. Portfolio 10 10 
4. House 20 30 
5. Other 5 10 
Total 100 100 
Following algorithm 1, find a number r, satisfying (2). From Table 3 we have 
∑ 𝑎𝑖
1
𝑖=1  = 15,  ∑ 𝑏𝑖
5
𝑖=2  = 90, ∑ 𝑎𝑖
2
𝑖=1  = 55,  ∑ 𝑏𝑖
5
𝑖=3  = 50, 
that means that r = 2 satisfies (2). In correspondence with step 5 of AW procedure, Ann receives 
cottage (15), and (5/6) of retirement account, while Ben receives portfolio (10), house (30), other (10),) 
and (1/6) of retirement account. Thus, everyone has 56.67% in terms of their own valuations, which is 
essentially more than a half (50%). Proportionality, equitability and efficiency of this division 
immediately follow from the above mentioned theorem. Note, that this fair division gives more for 
both participants than the division, considered at the beginning of this example.  
 
1.4. Notion of divisibility 
In [1], an item (good, issue) is called divisible, if it can be divided at any point along a continuum 
without destroying its value, and indivisible, if it cannot be divided without destroying its value. Of 
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course, the notion of divisibility is an informal notion that must be discussed before division itself. 
Despite the significant (and sometimes crucial) importance of divisibility in many practical division 
problems, the analysis of this notion is beyond the scope of this work. However, one of the most 
attractive features of AW procedure consists in the following. This procedure guarantees that not more 
than one item must be divided; every other item is given to one of the participants entirely. This allows 
in many cases to avoid items division that is often difficult and informal task.  
Because in AW procedure only one item (whose number is determined by algorithm 1) can be divided, 
this procedure gives a fair (i.e. proportional, equitable and efficient) division in all the cases, where 
this selected item is divisible independently of divisibility of all the other items.  
Further we will consider the data about divisibility of items as initial data that cannot be discussed at 
the framework of this investigation. Of course, possibility (or impossibility) to divide some items can 
affect results of division, sometimes essentially. The next example gives a simple illustration of the 
notion of divisibility. 
Example 2 (continuation). Let us reorder items from Table 2 so that they satisfy condition (1): 
                                                                                     Table 4 
Conflict items Firm A Firm B 
1. Laying off  30 10 
2. CEO assignment 25 10 
3. President assignment 15 20 
4. Headquarters 20 35 
5. Name 10 25 
Total 100 100 
Here, as everywhere in this material, values given by participants mean only relative importance of the 
corresponding items; they do not have any positive or negative sense. 
It is natural to consider only the first item as a divisible one, while the other items cannot be divided 
(at least, arbitrary). Division possibilities in this case are carefully analyzed in [2]. Let us start with 
AW procedure without care about divisibility. The procedure gives items 1 and 2 to firm A, items 4 
and 5 to firm B, and requires the division of item 3, i.e. president assignment, in proportion 5:2 
between participants. Everyone receives 65,71% in terms of their own valuations. 
In this case it is not difficult simply to consider all the possibilities and find a fair division satisfying 
the following condition: only the first item (laying off) can be divided. Firm A receives item 2 (25%), 
item 4 (20%), and (3 ⁄4) of item 1 (22,5%), while firm B receives item 4 (35%), item 5 (25%) and (1⁄4) 
of item 1 (2,5%). Both have 62,5%; it is naturally that taking into account indivisibility of some items 
can decrease the common gains; here we have 62,5% instead of 65,71%. 
 
 
 
1.5. Informal statement of problem 
Example 3. Let us consider a hypothetical division problem with two divisible and three indivisible 
items: 
                                              Table 5 
Items A B 
1 10 30 
2 10 20 
3 35 18 
4 30 20 
5 15 12 
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Total 100 100 
Items 1 and 2 are divisible; items 3, 4 and 5 are indivisible. 
Let us consider two different divisions. The 1st division: participant A receives indivisible item 3 
(35%), indivisible item 5 (15%) and (2⁄3) of divisible item 2 (6,67%), while participant B receives 
indivisible item 4 (20%), divisible item 1 (30%) and (1⁄3) of divisible item 2 (6,67%); therefore each 
participant has 56,67%. The 2nd division: participant A receives indivisible item 3 (35%) and 
indivisible item 4 (30%), while participant B receives indivisible item 5 (12%), divisible item 1 (30%) 
and divisible item 2 (20%); therefore, A has 65% and B has 62%. This means that the 1st division is 
not a fair division because it is not efficient (65 >56,67 and 62 >56,67). 
Example 3 will be formally analyzed further but it is clear that no fair division exists in the considered 
case. The first division looks fair, because it gives the same gain to both participants (and no other 
division gives greater equal gains). The second division looks fair, because it gives more to each 
participant (and cannot be improved for both of them: if one receives more, the other receives less).  
The fact of the absence of fair (in the above mentioned sense) divisions in some situations, of course, 
is not a new one. However, the problem of fair division in cases where both types of items – divisible 
and indivisible – are present simultaneously up to now has not been formally stated and studied. In this 
connection the following problems arise: 
 introduce reasonable formal modifications of the notion of fair division, adequate to both types 
of items; 
 elaborate a computationally efficient (non-enumerative) method for finding division fair in the 
introduced senses; 
 formulate and prove necessary and sufficient conditions of existence of proportional, equitable 
and fair divisions in terms of items evaluation by participants. 
The article is devoted to solving these problems. 
 
2. Basic notions, definitions, and statements  
Let us start with more detailed notions. Assume there are L divisible and M indivisible items. Denote 
value of divisible and indivisible items for participant A by 𝑎1
𝑑, …, 𝑎𝐿
𝑑,  𝑎1
𝑤, …, 𝑎𝑀
𝑤   and for participant 
B by  𝑏1
𝑑, …, 𝑏𝐿
𝑑,  𝑏1
𝑤, …, 𝑏𝑀
𝑤.  The sums of all the values are the same for each participant. It is not 
required that they are equal to 100. Instead of 100 it is possible to consider any natural number 
(denoted by H): 
∑ 𝑎𝑖
𝑑𝐿
𝑖=1  + ∑ 𝑎𝑖
𝑤𝑀
𝑖=1  = ∑ 𝑏𝑖
𝑑𝐿
𝑖=1  + ∑ 𝑏𝑖
𝑤𝑀
𝑖=1  = H.                                           (3) 
Cases L = 0 (no divisible items) and M = 0 (no indivisible items) are not excluded. The triple of 
numbers S = L, M, H will be called the signature of a division problem.  
Thus, any division problem can be formally described by a triple a, b, S of three objects: a = ad, aw, 
b = bd, bw, S = L, M, H, where  
ad = (𝑎1
𝑑, …, 𝑎𝐿
𝑑), aw = (𝑎1
𝑤, …, 𝑎𝑀
𝑤), bd = (𝑏1
𝑑, …, 𝑏𝐿
𝑑), bw = (𝑏1
𝑤, …, 𝑏𝑀
𝑤), 
S is the signature of the problem. 
Furthermore, any division in a problem with signature S is presented as a couple x, σ, where x = (x1, 
…, xL), xi are real numbers such that 
0 ≤ xj ≤ 1 (i = 1, …, L), 
and σ = (σ1, …,  σM), 
σi{0, 1} (i = 1, …, M). 
In these terms participant A receives (xi)-th part and participant B receives (1–xi)-th part of divisible 
item i (i = 1, …, L); indivisible item i is given to participant A, if σi = 1, and to participant B, if σi = 0  
(i = 1, …, M). 
Let us consider an arbitrary division problem a, b, S. Assume x, σ is a division in this problem.  
Assume 
𝐺A
𝑑(x) = ∑ 𝑎𝑖
𝑑𝑥𝑖
𝐿
𝑖=1 ,                                                                (4a) 
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𝐺B
𝑑(x) = ∑ 𝑏𝑖
𝑑(1 − 𝑥𝑖)
𝐿
𝑖=1 ,                                                          (4b) 
𝐺A
𝑤(σ) = ∑ 𝑎𝑖
𝑤𝜎𝑖
𝑀
𝑖=1 ,                                                               (5a) 
𝐺B
𝑤(σ) = ∑ 𝑏𝑖
𝑤(1 − 𝜎𝑖)
𝑀
𝑖=1 ,                                                         (5b) 
GA(x, σ) = 𝐺A
𝑑(x) + 𝐺A
𝑤(σ),                                                         (6a) 
GB(x, σ) = 𝐺B
𝑑(x) + 𝐺B
𝑤(σ).                                                         (6b) 
Thus, G(x, σ) = (GA(x, σ), (GB(x, σ)) is the pair of gains received by participants as a result of division 
x, σ. Pair Gd(x) = (𝐺A
𝑑(x), 𝐺B
𝑑(x)) is the pair of gains of distribution x of divisible items only, and pair 
Gw(σ) = (𝐺A
𝑤(σ), 𝐺B
𝑤(σ)) is the pair of gains of distribution σ of indivisible items only. 
From the above notations it is clear that for any division x, σ 
G(x, σ) = Gd(x) + Gw(σ)                                                             (7) 
(the sum in (7) is the vector sum). 
 
2.1. Properties of divisions 
The properties of divisions mentioned in section 1.2 are expressed in these terms as follows. 
Efficiency of division x, σ means that for any other division y, τ at least one of the following 
inequalities:  
GA(x, σ) > GA(y, τ), 
GB(x, σ) > GB(y, τ) 
is true (none division gives more for one and at least the same for the other). 
Proportionality of a division x, σ means that 
GA(x, σ) ≥ H ⁄ 2, 
GB(x, σ) ≥ H ⁄ 2 
(everyone receives at least half in his or her own values. 
Equitability of a division x, σ means that both participants receive the same (in their own values):                                                                                                                         
GA(x, σ) = GB(x, σ).                                                                 (8) 
Remember that a division x, σ was named a fair division, if it possesses properties of efficiency, 
proportionality and equitability. Here the simple interconnections between these properties are 
considered. 
Assume  
U(S) be the set of all the division problems with a given signature S (the set of all the triples a, b, S); 
E(S) be the set of all such problems that have efficient divisions, 
P(S) be the set of all such problems that have proportional divisions, 
Q(S) be the set of all such problems that have equitable divisions, 
F(S) be the set of all such problems that have fair divisions. 
Let us start with the following simple 
Statement 1. The connections between the considered sets is described by the following inclusions: 
F(S)  Q(S)P(S)E(S) = U(S).                                                    (9) 
Proof. Let us go from right to left in (9).  
1. Assume x, σ is an arbitrary division in an arbitrary problem a, b, S with a given signature S. 
Assume that in S L > 0 (at least one divisible item exists). If x, σ it is efficient itself that means that 
the considered problem belongs to E(S) by definition. Otherwise, denote by K(x, σ) the set of all the 
divisions that dominate x, σ or give the same gains. Because there is a finite set of different Boolean 
vectors τ, the set K(x, σ) is the union of a finite number of subsets Kτ(x, σ) consisting of divisions with 
the same indivisible part τ. It is clear that all these sets Kτ(x, σ) are compact ones; hence, the 
corresponding sets of pairs (GA, GB) are compact, too, (see formulae (4) – (6)). This implies that the 
set R(x, σ) of all the gains, corresponding to division from K(x, σ), is a compact one. Therefore there is 
at least one division y, τ, such that the corresponding pair (GA(y, τ), GB(y, τ)) maximizes GA + GB 
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over set R(x, σ). Division y, τ is an efficient division. If it is wrong that means that there is a division 
z, υ, dominating y, τ; hence, it dominates x, σ. Then by the construction it must belong to K(x, σ), 
but by the definition of y, τ it is impossible. The contradiction proves the assertion in case L > 0. In 
case L = 0 all the considered sets are finite ones and the assertion is true. 
2. The inclusion P(S)E(S) is proved analogously the previous one: any proportional division is 
efficient itself or it is dominated by an efficient division (this is proved exactly as in the previous part 
1); the latest is proportional because every participant gains more or the same.  
3. In order to prove the inclusion Q(S)P(S), let us introduce the useful notion of complement 
division. For any division x, σ let us define the division  ,x  (called the complement division) such 
that  
x i = 1– xi (i = 1, …, L), 
 i = 1– σi (i = 1, …, M). 
Formulas (3) and (4) – (6) imply that  
GA( ,x ) = H – GA(x, σ), 
GB( ,x ) = H – GB(x, σ); 
because GA(x, σ) = GB(x, σ), at least one of two equitable divisions x, σ and  ,x  is proportional 
that implies the required inclusion. 
4. The inclusion F(S)  Q(S) is true, because by definition of fair division it is equitable.  
The statement 1 is proved. 
Above mentioned theorem 4.1 from book [1] can be formulated as follows. 
Statement 2. For division problems such that in their signatures M = 0 (i.e. any item is divisible) all 
the inclusions in (9) are equalities. 
It is clear that even one indivisible item disturbs this beautiful picture. At the same time, fear divisions 
can exist even in the case L = 0 (i.e. any item is indivisible).  
Let us introduce notions concerning an arbitrary division problem a, b, S itself (not its specific 
divisions). Denote  
Ad (a, b, S) = ⋃ 𝐺𝑑(𝑥)𝑥 ,                                                        (10) 
where the union is taken over all the distributions x of L divisible items only; 
Aw(a, b, S) = ⋃ 𝐺𝑤(𝜎)𝜎 , 
where the union is taken over all the distributions σ of M indivisible items only; 
A(a, b, S) = ⋃ 𝐺(𝑥, 𝜎)〈𝑥,𝜎〉 , 
where the union is taken over all the divisions x, σ in problems with a given signature S. 
The three defined sets – Ad (a, b, S), Aw (a, b, S), A(a, b, S) – are sets of points in plane. 
From the above notations and formula (7) it is clear that  
A(a, b, S) = Ad (a, b, S) + Aw (a, b, S).                                           (11) 
Finally, denote by 𝐴𝑑
𝑃(a, b, S),  𝐴𝑤
𝑃 (𝑎, 𝑏, S) and AP(a, b, S) Pareto-optimal parts of Ad (a, b, S), Aw(a, b, 
S) and A(a, b, S), correspondingly. 
Introduced notions immediately imply 
Statement 3. Assume a division x, σ is efficient, i.e. G(x, σ) ϵ AP(a, b, S). Then Gd(x) ϵ 𝐴𝑑
𝑃(a, b, S) 
and Gw(σ) ϵ 𝐴𝑤
𝑃 (𝑎, 𝑏, S). 
This statement means that for any efficient divisions x, σ its «projections» x and σ are efficient in the 
corresponding «projections» Ad (a, b, S) and Aw (a, b, S) of set A(a, b, S). Set A(a, b, S) can be named 
«attainability set» of the considered division problem a, b, S.  
In order to illustrate the introduced notions, consider the following example (see section 1.5). 
Example 3. Continuation. 1.The initial data for this case is given in Table 5. The two first rows in 
this table describe divisible items that are rewritten in Table 6: 
                                            Table 6 
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Items A B 
1 10 30 
2 10 20 
Total 20 50 
 
Set Ad (a, b, S) of all the points, corresponding to all the possible distributions of these divisible items, 
is the set of all points presented as 
(10x+10y, 30(1–x)+20(1–y)),                                                     (12) 
where  
0 ≤ x ≤ 1, 0 ≤ y ≤ 1.                                                             (13) 
In (12), (13) x and y are the parts of divisible items 1 and 2, received by participant A. 
Moving pair (x, y) along the way(0,0)→(0,1)→(1,1)→(1,0)→(0,0) and calculating corresponding 
points by formula (12), we find the quadrilateral shown in Fig.1. It coincides with Ad (a, b, S). Its 
Pareto-optimal part 𝐴𝑑
𝑃(a, b, S) is shown in the figure. 
2. The three last rows in this table 5 describe indivisible items that are rewritten in Table 7. There are 8 
possibilities of distributions of three indivisible items between two participants that can be presented 
by 8 Boolean vectors σ = (σ1, σ2, σ3). Using formulae (5) we find that set Aw(a, b, S) in the considered 
case consists of 8 points    
(35σ1 + 30σ2 + 15σ3, 18(1–σ1) + 20(1–σ2) + 12(1–σ3)), 
where (σ1, σ2, σ3) are all the Boolean vectors with 3 components. Substituting (σ1, σ2, σ3) consecutively 
with their values from (0,0,0) till (1,1,1) easily find 8 points in the plane: 
Aw(a, b, S) = {(0, 50), (15, 38), (30, 30), (45, 18), (35, 32), (50, 20), (65, 12), (80, 0)}.      (14) 
Among 8 points (14) there are two dominated: (30, 30) is dominated by (35, 32), and (45, 18) is 
dominated by (50, 20). Therefore, 𝐴𝑤
𝑃 (𝑎, 𝑏, S) consists of 6 points:  
𝐴𝑤
𝑃 (𝑎, 𝑏, S) = {(0, 50), (15, 38), (35, 32), (50, 20), (65, 12), (80, 0)}. 
3. The attainability set A(a, b, S) in the considered example is easily constructed using (11) and 
explicit presentation of sets Ad  (a, b, S) and Aw (a, b, S), given in Fig.1 and 2. This set A(a, b, S) is 
marked grey in Fig.3. The Pareto-optimal part AP(a, b, S) of the attainability set A(a, b, S) is shown in 
Fig.4. 
By virtue of statement 3, it is enough to add to each point belonging to the finite set  𝐴𝑤
𝑃 (𝑎, 𝑏, S), 
shown in Fig.2, the set 𝐴𝑑
𝑃(a, b, S), shown in Fig.1 (adding here means coordinate adding of two-
dimension vectors). 
In Fig.4 the different parts of Pareto-optimal border AP(a, b, S) of the attainability set A(a, b, S) are 
marked bold; a white circle at the end of a part means that the corresponding point belongs to the part; 
the absence of a circle means that the corresponding end does not belong to AP(a, b, S). The point 
marked by a black square presents an equitable division with maximal possible gains 56,67. This 
division is not a fair one, because it is not efficient: the point (65, 62) dominates the marked equitable 
division as well as any other equitable division (65>56,67 and 62>56,67). Therefore, in the considered 
problem there are no fair divisions at all. Note that the properties of divisions are determined by 
geometry of Pareto set AP(a, b, S). 
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Fig.1 
                                                  Table 7 
Items A B 
3 35 18 
4 30 20 
5 15 12 
Total 80 50 
 
Fig.2 
 
 
Fig.3 
 
Fig.4 
 
2.2. General structure of Ad (a, b, S) 
In Example 3 (see Fig.1) set Ad  (a, b, S) is a center-symmetrical convex polygon, whose all the edges 
have negative slope. The same is true for arbitrary division problem a, b, S. Let us consider the 
structure of Ad (a, b, S) in general case in more detail.  
Assume 
s1 = ∑ 𝑎𝑖
𝐿
𝑖=1 ,                                                                    (15a) 
s2 = ∑ 𝑏𝑖
𝐿
𝑖=1                                                                      (15b) 
(index d is omitted for simplicity). To construct the set, assume that values are ordered as in (1): 
a1 ⁄ b1  ≥ a2 ⁄ b2  ≥  ...  ≥ aL ⁄ bL.                                                       (16) 
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It is clear that set Ad (a, b, S) is a convex polygon.  
Let us consider the unit cube in L-dimension space. Any point x = (x1, …, xL) belonging to this cube 
determines point f(x) belonging to polygon Ad (a, b, S): 
f(x) = (∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑥𝑖
𝐿
𝑖=1 ,  ∑ 𝑏𝑖(1 − 𝑥𝑖)
𝐿
𝑖=1 ) 
(see formulae (4)) and any point of the polygon coincides with f(x) for some x. Let us consider all the 
vertices of  the unit cube starting with (0,0,…,0) till (1,1,…,1). The images of these vertices cover 
completely all the vertices of polygon Ad(a, b, S). The vertex (0,0,…,0) correspond to the left point (0, 
s2). Consider the edges connecting vertex (0,0,…,0) to the L adjacent vertices of unit cub: (1,0,…,0), 
(0,1,…,0), …, (0,0,…,1). Corresponding segments on the plane have the common left end (0, s2) and 
slopes bi ⁄ai  (i = 1, …, L). Order (16) means that the minimal possible slope has the segment 
connecting point (0, s2) to the point (a1, s2–b1), because its inverse value a1 ⁄ b1 is the maximal. That 
means that this segment is a part of border of Ad (a, b, S). Considering the next vertex (a1, s2–b1), 
analogously find the next border point (a1 + a2, s2–b1–b2), and so on, up to the last point (s1, 0) (see 
(15)). Thus, set 𝐴𝑑
𝑃(a, b, S) is the broken line whose k-th point is: 
(∑ 𝑎𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1 , ∑ 𝑏𝑖
𝐿
𝑖=𝑘+1 ) (k = 1, …, L); 
The 0-th point is (0, s1). The geometrical illus- 
tration is given in Fig.5. The same reasoning im- 
plies that the low border of the polygon consists of 
the same segments in reverse order. Therefore, 
point (s1/2, s2/2) is the center of symmetry of the 
polygon.  
In the case M = 0 there are only L divisible items, 
and the reasoning of this section gives another 
proof of statement 2 (theorem 4.1 from [1]). 
Indeed, in this case s1 = s2 = H, and intersection of 
line x = y with broken line 𝐴𝑑
𝑃(a, b, S) determines 
the same fair division.  
Fig.5 
 
The established structure of set Ad (a, b, S) implies several important corollaries (formulated further as 
statements): 
Statement 4. Assume x, σ is an arbitrary efficient division. Then not more than one item must be 
divided; every other item is given to one of the participants entirely.  
Proof. We have (see (7)) G(x, σ) = Gd(x) + Gw(σ) and by virtue of statement 3 Gd(x) ϵ 𝐴𝑑
𝑃(a, b, S). That 
means that point G(x, σ) belongs to broken line Gw(σ) + 𝐴𝑑
𝑃(a, b, S). Every vertex on this line presents 
distribution of all the divisible items as whole (see the previous construction), and any point inside a 
segment between two vertices presents division of the item, corresponding to this segment. 
Statement 5. Assume x, σ is a maximal equitable division (i.e. an equitable division with maximal 
possible common gain). Then not more than one item must be divided; every other item is given to one 
of the participants entirely. 
Proof. Because x, σ is an equitable division, point G(x, σ) must belong to line x = y. Consider 
intersection of line x = y with any polygon Gw(σ) + Ad (a, b, S). If point G(x, σ) does not belong to 
Gw(σ) + 𝐴𝑑
𝑃(a, b, S), then both coordinates of G(x, σ) can be increased, i.e. x, σ is not a maximal 
equitable division. Therefore, it belongs to broken line Gw(σ) + 𝐴𝑑
𝑃(a, b, S) that implies the assertion by 
the same reasoning as at the end of the previous prove. 
 
3. Modifications of notion of fair division 
Now we introduce the essential notions of this work – modifications of notion of fair division. In the 
division problem from Example 3 it is impossible to provide efficiency and equitability simultaneously 
– we can receive the equitable division that is not efficient or the efficient division that is not equitable 
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(see points in Fig.4). It is not a pathologic exception: it really happens in several examples given fur- 
ther in section 6. 
These examples led us to the following formal definitions. 
A division x, σ in problem a, b, S is profitably fairy if it is 
 proportional; 
 efficient; 
 maximizes expression min{GA(x, σ), GB(x, σ)}over the set of all the divisions x, σ.  
A division x, σ in problem a, b, S is uniformly fairy if it is 
 proportional; 
 efficient;  
 minimizes expression |GA(x, σ) – GB(x, σ)| over the set of all such divisions x, σ.  
A division x, σ in problem a, b, S is equitably fairy if it is 
 proportional; 
 equitable; 
 maximizes common gain G over all such divisions x, σ.  
Thus, profitably fair divisions maximize minimal profits of participants but do not care about equality; 
uniformly fair divisions try to make profits as equal (uniform) as possible, yet under efficiency 
restriction; finally, equitably fairy divisions provide equality of profits but do not care about efficiency. 
There is an evident connection between these different kinds of fairness; let us formulate it as an 
assertion. 
Statement 6. Any division is fair if and only if it is profitably, uniformly, and equitably fair.  
Let us consider a polygon, denoted by A(σ):  
A(σ) = Gw(σ)  + Ad, 
where σ is an arbitrary distribution of indivisible items (see (5)), polygon Ad  is described in section 
2.2. Remember that the union of all these polygons (over all Boolean vectors σ) forms the attainability 
set A(a, b, S). 
Statement 7. If polygon A(σ) is completely below (above) line x = y, then its left (right) vertex maxi- 
mizes expression  
min{GA(x, σ), GB(x, σ)} 
and minimizes expression 
|GA(x, σ) – GB(x, σ)| 
over the polygon. 
Proof. It is enough to consider any line with a negative slope, because slopes of all the edges of the 
polygon are negative. For the second expression the geometric illustration of this evident fact is given 
in Fig.6. For the first expression it is evident because minimal y-coordinate of B is less than of A.  
Statement 8. If line x = y intersects polygon A(σ), then in intersection of this line and Pareto border of 
the polygon A(σ) the same expressions reach maximal and minimal values over the polygon, so that 
the value of the second expression is equal to 0, and GA(x, σ) = GB(x, σ)} 
This statement immediately follows from the previous definitions and constructions.  
Modified definitions of fair divisions together with Statements 4 and 5 imply  
Statement 9.  Any profitably, any uniformly, and any equitably fair division has the property: not 
more than one item must be divided; every other item is given to one of the participants entirely. 
It is clair that fair divisions also have the same property. 
 
 
 
 
4. Algorithms 
Statements 6 – 8 allow elaborating of computationally efficient algorithm of finding profitably, 
uniformly, and equitably fair divisions. All of them are found by this algorithm. Before describe the 
algorithm, let us consider the following useful procedure. 
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4.1. Constructing  𝑨𝒘
𝑷 (𝒂, 𝒃, 𝐒) 
Definition (5) means that set Aw(a, b, S) consists of all points with coordinates 
( ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝜎𝑖
𝑀
𝑖=1 ,   ∑ 𝑏𝑖(1 − 𝜎𝑖)
𝑀
𝑖=1  ), 
where σ = (σ1, …,  σM) is an arbitrary Boolean vector with M components (index w is omitted for 
simplicity).  
Assume Ax be the projection of set Aw(a, b, S) to x-axis. In Example 6 Ax consists of 8 numbers: Ax = 
{0, 15, 30, 35, 45, 50, 65, 80} (see (14)). By definition of projection for any x ϵ Ax  there is at least one 
number y such that  
(x, y) ϵ Aw(a, b, S).                                                              (17) 
Denote the maximal y satisfying (17) by y(x) and define set A as follows: 
A = {(x, y(x)) | x ϵ Ax }. 
By the definition of A it is clear that  
𝐴𝑤
𝑃 (𝑎, 𝑏, S) ⊆ A ⊆ Aw(a, b, S) 
and 
𝐴𝑤
𝑃 (𝑎, 𝑏, S) = AP; 
it means that the considered problem is reduced to construction of AP. Note, that in Example 3 the 
second inclusion is equality.  
In order to select the Pareto set AP from A it is enough simply to start with maximal number from Ax 
and go left, eliminating all the pairs in which y-components does not exceed the previous one. 
Therefore, the considered problem is reduced to the problem of finding A. 
Assume 
s1 = ∑ 𝑎𝑖
𝑀
𝑖=1 , 
s2 = ∑ 𝑏𝑖
𝑀
𝑖=1  
and consider the following family of optimization problem relatively Boolean variables σ1, …,  σM : 
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∑ 𝑏𝑖(1 − 𝜎𝑖)
𝑀
𝑖=1  → max                                                        (18) 
subject to  
∑ 𝑎𝑖𝜎𝑖
𝑀
𝑖=1  = k  (k = s1,  s1–1, s1–2, …, 1, 0).                                          (19) 
By the construction, for all k that do not belong to Ax, equation (19) is incompatible. For k = 0 equation 
(19) is compatible: the corresponding value of goal function (18) is s2. 
Assume  
τi = 1 – σi (i = 1, 2, …, M) 
and substitute in (18), (19) σi with 1 – τi (i = 1, 2, …, M). We receive the equivalent family of 
optimization problem relatively Boolean variables τ1, …, τM : 
∑ 𝑏𝑖𝜏𝑖
𝑀
𝑖=1  → max                                                                (20) 
subject to  
∑ 𝑎𝑖𝜏𝑖
𝑀
𝑖=1  = k  (k = 0, 1, …, s1).                                                    (21) 
Thus, the considered in this section problem of 𝐴𝑤
𝑃 (𝑎, 𝑏, S) construction is reduced to the solution of 
the family of optimization problems (20), (21). If for some k a solution exists, it gives a point of A 
corresponding to the following items distribution: participant A (B) receives item i, if τi = 0 (τi = 1).  
Consider now family (20), (21) of optimization problems. The problems differ from well-known 
knapsack problem only in the following: instead of weight restrictions (≤) there are equalities (=) in 
conditions (21). However, they can be solved (analogously knapsack problem) by dynamic 
programming. Let us consider the situation in more detail. 
Denote the optimization problem 
∑ 𝑏𝑖𝜏𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1  → max 
subject to  
∑ 𝑎𝑖𝜏𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1  = k 
by Z(k, p), and the optimal value of its goal function by F(k, p). Then Bellman equation for the 
problem is:  
F(k, p) = max {F(k, p–1), F(k–ap, p–1) + bp} (k = 0,1, …, s1; p = 2, …, M); 
if the maximal value here is F(k, p–1), that means that in the optimal solution τp = 0; otherwise, in the 
optimal solution τp = 1.  
Finally, initial value are determined by formula 
F(k, 1) = {
𝑏1 ,  if 𝑎1= k  
−∞,  otherwise
         k = 0,1, …, s1. 
The solution of optimization problem Z(k, p) for p = M corresponds to the solution of the initial 
problem (20), (21). If the goal function for some k is equal to –∞, then for this k equation (21) is 
incompatible. 
Thus, in this section the efficient and relatively simple algorithm of 𝐴𝑤
𝑃 (𝑎, 𝑏, S) construction is 
described. In more detail: by the construction, the algorithm is efficient relatively number H – the third 
component of the signature of the problem. Note, that the number of undominated points does not 
exceed H. 
 
4.2. Checking dominance 
In order to find profitably, uniformly, and equitably fair divisions it is necessary to know about 
arbitrary point (x, y) belonging to attainability set A(a, b, S), whether it corresponds to an efficient 
division, i.e. whether it belongs to Pareto-optimal part AP(a, b, S) of attainability set A(a, b, S). 
Statement 3 immediately implies that AP(a, b, S) is a subset of the following set: 
AP(a, b, S) ⊆ ⋃ 𝑍𝑖
𝑤
𝑖=1 ,                                                           (22) 
where  
Zi = Wi + 𝐴𝑑
𝑃(a, b, S)  (i = 1, …, w).                                               (23) 
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In (23) points Wi (i = 1, …, w) form set 𝐴𝑤
𝑃 (𝑎, 𝑏, S) of different undominated pairs of gains from 
distribution of indivisible items only; they are found by the algorithm from section 4.1. 
Remember that 𝐴𝑑
𝑃(a, b, S) is a broken line with L edges, which is an upper part of border of a convex 
polygon Ad (a, b, S) (see section 2.2 and Fig.5). By the construction of Zi all their graphs are received 
as shifts of the same graph 𝐴𝑑
𝑃(a, b, S) by vectors Wi .  
Inclusion (22) implies that a point (x, y) is undominated into A(a, b, S) if and only if it does not 
dominated by any point belonging to ⋃ 𝑍𝑖
𝑤
𝑖=1 . Therefore, it is enough to check, whether point (x, y) is 
dominated by a point belonging to one of known broken lines Wi + 𝐴𝑑
𝑃(a, b, S) (i = 1, …, w). Hence, 
the problem is reduced to checking dominance for every broken line (23) separately. The last problem 
finally is reduced to the analogous problem for every of L edges forming one line; and the solution of 
this problem is evident.  
It is clear that the bulk of all these operations is computationally efficient (relatively parameters w and 
L).    
 
4.3. Constructing equitable fair division 
In this section an algorithm for construction of an equitable fair division is suggested. Division x, σ is 
an equitable fair division if it is a solution of optimization problem 
∑ 𝑎𝑖
𝑑𝑥𝑖
𝐿
𝑖=1  +  ∑ 𝑎𝑖
𝑤𝜎𝑖
𝑀
𝑖=1  → max                                                   (24) 
subject to 
∑ 𝑎𝑖
𝑑𝑥𝑖
𝐿
𝑖=1  +  ∑ 𝑎𝑖
𝑤𝜎𝑖
𝑀
𝑖=1  = ∑ 𝑏𝑖
𝑑(1 − 𝑥𝑖)
𝐿
𝑖=1  +  ∑ 𝑏𝑖
𝑤(1 − 𝜎𝑖)
𝑀
𝑖=1 .                        (25) 
Equality (25) for gains follows immediately from (8), taking into account (4) – (6). 
Statement 9 allows reducing the considered problem to the analogous problem with exactly one 
indivisible item. In more detail: let us consider the problem with the same values of participants and 
additional condition: only item k (among divisible in the initial problem items 1, 2, …, L) is divisible; 
all the other items are indivisible. That means that in equality (25) variable xi{0,1} (i=1, …, M; i≠k).       
Denote this problem by Z(k). Using introduced in section 2 notion of signature, the signature of Z(k) is 
1, L+M–1, H (instead of initial signature S = L, M, H).  
Denote the value of goal function (24) in problem Z(k) by F(k). Assume 
F(k*) = max
1≤𝑘≤𝑀
𝐹(𝑘); 
then the corresponding to this number k* division x, σ is an equitable fair division in the considered 
initial division problem a, b, S. 
Thus, the problem of construction of an equitable fair division is reduced to the same problem in 
situations where only one item is divisible.  
4.3.1. Case of one divisible item. In order to simplify notations, in this section a division problem is 
described by a couple a, b, where a = (a0, a1,  …, aN), b = ( b0, b1,  …, bN ) are values of participants; 
item 0 is only divisible item; all the other items are indivisible. Any division is presented by a couple 
x, σ, where  
0 ≤ x ≤ 1;                                                                   (26) 
σ = (σ1, …, σN) is a Boolean vector. In these notations optimization problem (24), (25) is written as 
xa0 +  ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝜎𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1  → max                                                        (27) 
subject to 
xa0 +  ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝜎𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1  = (1– x)b0 + ∑ 𝑏𝑖(1 − 𝜎𝑖)
𝑁
𝑖=1 .                                      (28) 
Condition (28) can be rewritten equivalently as 
∑ 𝑎𝑖𝜎𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1  – ∑ 𝑏𝑖(1 − 𝜎𝑖)
𝑁
𝑖=1  = (1– x)b0 – xa0.                                       (29) 
Let us consider the double inequality 
–a0 ≤  ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝜎𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1  – ∑ 𝑏𝑖(1 − 𝜎𝑖)
𝑁
𝑖=1  ≤ b0.                                             (30) 
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Statement 10. Couple x, σ satisfies conditions (26), (28) if and only if Boolean vector σ satisfies 
double inequality (30). 
Proof. 1. For x = 0 (1– x)b0 – xa0 = b0, for x = 1 (1– x)b0 – xa0 = –a0, which implies that for any x
[0,1] right-hand side of (29) belongs to segment [–a0, b0]. Therefore, for any couple x, σ satisfying 
(26), (28) vector σ satisfies double inequality (30). 
2. Assume Boolean vector σ satisfies double inequality (30). Let 
z = ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝜎𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1  – ∑ 𝑏𝑖(1 − 𝜎𝑖)
𝑁
𝑖=1 .                                                  (31) 
By virtue of (30)  
–a0 ≤ z ≤ b0.                                                                 (32) 
Define a number x from the equality 
z = (1– x)b0 – xa0,                                                             (33) 
implying 
x = 
𝑏0−𝑧
𝑏0+𝑎0
;                                                                   (34) 
from (34) and right inequality in (32) we have 0 ≤ x, and from (34) and left inequality in (32) we have 
x ≤ 1; together they coincide with (26). 
Equality (28) follows from substitution in (31) z with right-hand side of (33) and rearrangement of the 
expression. Statement is proved. 
Assume 
ci = ai + bi (i = 1, …, N),                                                        (35) 
Statement 11. Division problem a, b (with one divisible item) has an equitable division if and only if 
the following systems of two linear inequalities relatively Boolean variables σ1, …, σN  
H – (a0 + b0) ≤ ∑ 𝑐𝑖𝜎𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1  ≤ H.                                                    (36) 
is compatible. 
Proof. By virtue of statement 10 equitability of a division is equivalent to existence of solutions of 
double inequality (30). Rewrite (30) as  
–a0 ≤  ∑ (𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖)𝜎𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1   –   ∑ 𝑏𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1  ≤ b0.                     
Adding to every part ∑ 𝑏𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 , we receive 
–a0 + ∑ 𝑏𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1   ≤  ∑ (𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖)𝜎𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1   ≤ b0 +  ∑ 𝑏𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 .                                    (37) 
Right-hand side of (37) is the sum of all the values of  participant B, and, hence, is equal to H. Left-
hand side of (36) is equal to –a0 + (H – b0) = H – (a0 + b0). Taking into account (35), finally write (37) 
as (36). 
By the reverse way (36) can be rewritten as (30). By virtue of statement 10 double inequality (30) is 
equivalent to equitability of a division. The statement is proved. 
Statement 12. An equitable division x, σ is a solution of optimization problem (27) subjected to (26), 
(28) if and only if Boolean vector σ is a solution of optimization problem 




N
i
ii
i
ab
baab
1
00
00  + 
00
0
ab
Ha

→ max                                                 (38) 
subject to (36). 
Proof. It is enough to express x through σ from (28), substitute x with this expression in goal function 
(27) and rearrange the formula. 
Now we can multiply goal function (38) by (b0 + a0), subtract Ha0, and finally receive 
Statement 13. The considered problem of construction of equitable division in a problem with one 
divisible item is reduced to optimization problem relatively Boolean variables σ1, …, σN  
∑ 𝑑𝑖𝜎𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 → max                                                              (39) 
subject to (36), where di = b0ai  –  a0bi  (i = 1, 2, …, N) are integer numbers. 
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Problem (39), (36) is replaced by the family of problems with the same goal function (39) and 
condition 
∑ 𝑐𝑖𝜎𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1  = k  (k = H–(a0 + b0), H–(a0 + b0)+1, …, H);                               (40) 
they are solved as problems (20), (21) in section 4.1 (by dynamic programming).  
Thus, the reasoning in this section shows that an equitable fair division in general case can be found by 
the suggested computationally efficient method. Pay attention that solving problem (39), (40) we 
automatically check compatibility of condition (40) for every k = H–(a0 + b0), H–(a0 + b0)+1, …, H; 
the incompatibility for all k means that the considered division problem does not have equitably fair 
divisions. 
 
4.4. Essential algorithm 
The essential algorithm of finding profitably, uniformly, and equitably fair divisions is based on 
Statements 7 and 8 and the algorithms from section 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3. 
The main steps of the essential algorithm briefly are described as follows. 
Step 1. Assume sg = 1. Construct an equitably fair division x, σ by the algorithm from section 4.3. If 
no equitably fair division exists, assume sg = 0 and go to Step 3. Otherwise, assume e = GA(x, σ) and 
go to Step 2. 
Step 2. Check dominancy of point (e, e) (where e is found in step 1) by the algorithm, described in 
section 4.2. If this point (e, e) is undominated, then division x, σ is simultaneously profitably, 
uniformly and equitably fair division. The algorithm stops. 
Step 3. Construct set 𝐴𝑤
𝑃 (𝑎, 𝑏, S) = {W1, W2, …, Ww} by algorithm from section 4.1. 
Step 4. Construct set (23) of broken lines Zi = Wi + 𝐴𝑑
𝑃(a, b, S)  (i = 1, …, w). 
Step 5. Assume P = ∅, U = ∅ (initial assignments for current sets of profitably and uniformly fair divi- 
sions).  
Step 6. For i = 1, …, w do the following: 
Step 6.1. If Zi is completely below line x = y, denote the division corresponding to its left vertex 
by z, τ and go to Step 6.3. Otherwise, go to Step 6.2. 
Step 6.2. If Zi is completely above line x = y, denote the division corresponding to its right vertex 
by z, τ and go to Step 6.3. Otherwise, continue the cycle in Step 6. 
Step 6.3. Assume P = P ∪{z, τ}, U = U ∪{z, τ}; continue the cycle in Step 6.  
Step 7. Assume Q = P ∪ U. 
Step 8. Eliminate from Q all the divisions z, τ, such that GA(z, τ) or GB(z, τ) is less then H ⁄ 2.  
If Q is empty, then profitably fair divisions, uniformly fair divisions, and equitably fair divisions in the 
considered problem do not exist. The algorithm stops. Otherwise, go to Step 9. 
(Comment: if Q is empty, let us consider two cases: sg = 0 and sg = 1 (see Step 1). In the case sg = 0 
no equitably fair division exists; in the case sg = 1 the equitably fair division x, σ, found in Step 1, is 
the efficient division, but in this case the algorithm had to stop in Step 2).   
Step 9. Denote by X the set of all the points (GA(z, τ), GB(z, τ)), where z, τ ∈ Q; denote by XP Pareto-
optimal part of X and by QP the set all the divisions, whose gains (GA(z, τ), GB(z, τ)) belong to XP; 
denote by q the cardinality of XP. 
Step 10. For i = 1, …, q do the following: 
Step 10.1. Checking dominance of i-th point (xi, yi) from X
P by algorithm from section 4.2.  
Step 10.2. If (xi, yi) is dominated, then assume X
P = XP  ∖ {(xi, yi)}; continue. 
Step 11. Maximize the expression min{x, y} over set of points XP. The corresponding division is a 
profitably fair one. 
Step 12. Minimizes the expression |x – y| over set of points XP. The corresponding division is a 
uniformly fair one. 
Step 13. The algorithm stops, because profitably, uniformly and equitably fair divisions are found 
(correspondingly, in Steps 11, 12 and 1).  
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5. Existence conditions in division problems 
In this section the last of the mentioned at the end of section 1.5 problems is considered. Namely, 
though the diagnostic is included into essential algorithm described in section 4.4, the existence or 
absence of some properties can be established easier, without full completion of all the operations. We 
establish necessary and sufficient conditions of existence of proportional and equitable fair divisions in 
terms of items evaluation by participants. 
Consider an arbitrary problem a, b, S, where S = L, M, H. That means that there are L divisible 
items, M indivisible items and sums of participants’ values are equal to H. Assume  
S1 = ∑ 𝑎𝑖
𝑑𝐿
𝑖=1 , S2 = ∑ 𝑏𝑖
𝑑𝐿
𝑖=1 , T1 = ∑ 𝑎𝑖
𝑤𝐿
𝑖=1 , T2 = ∑ 𝑏𝑖
𝑤𝐿
𝑖=1 .                               (41) 
Let us associate with any problem a, b, S the following systems of linear inequality relatively 
Boolean variables σ1, …, σM: 
{
∑ 𝜎𝑖𝑎𝑖
𝑤 ≤ 𝐻/2,𝑀𝑖=1
∑ 𝜎𝑖𝑏𝑖
𝑤 ≥ 𝐻/2; 𝑀𝑖=1
                                                              (42) 
 
{
∑ 𝜎𝑖𝑎𝑖
𝑤 ≥ 𝐻/2,𝑀𝑖=1
∑ 𝜎𝑖𝑏𝑖
𝑤 ≤ 𝐻/2; 𝑀𝑖=1
                                                              (43) 
 
{
∑ 𝑐𝑖𝜎𝑖
𝑀
𝑖=1  ≤  𝐻,                        
∑ 𝑐𝑖𝜎𝑖
𝑀
𝑖=1 ≥ 𝐻 − (𝑆1 + 𝑆2),   
                                              (44) 
where 
ci = 𝑎𝑖
𝑤 + 𝑏𝑖
𝑤 (i = 1,…,M).                                                    (45) 
Statement 14. Problem a, b, SP(S) (i.e. proportional divisions exist) if and only if at least one of 
inequalities systems (42), (43), (45) is compatible.  
Proof. Assume  
T1(σ)  = ∑ 𝜎𝑖𝑎𝑖
𝑤𝑀
𝑖=1 , T2(σ)  = ∑ (1 − 𝜎𝑖)𝑏𝑖
𝑤𝑀
𝑖=1 , T(σ) = (T1(σ), T2(σ)).                          (46) 
Let us consider set A(σ) = T(σ) + Ad (a, b, S) (see formula (10)). A(σ) is a shifted polygon Ad(a, b, S). 
By definition, proportional division exist if and only if polygon A(σ) intersects set P of the plane, 
defined as follows:  
P = {(x, y) | x ≥ H ⁄ 2, y ≥ H ⁄ 2} 
at least for one Boolean vector σ. 
It can happen in one of the three cases: 
1) left vertex of A(σ) (point (T1(σ), T2(σ) + S2) belongs to P; 
2) right vertex of A(σ) (point (T1(σ) + S1, T2(σ)) belongs to P; 
3) vertices defined in 1) and 2) do not belong to P, but at least one point of A(σ) belongs to P. 
In the 1st case we have inequalities (see (41) and (46)): 
∑ 𝜎𝑖𝑎𝑖
𝑤𝑀
𝑖=1  ≥ H ⁄ 2,                                                           (47a) 
∑ (1 − 𝜎𝑖)𝑏𝑖
𝑤𝑀
𝑖=1  + ∑ 𝑏𝑖
𝑑𝐿
𝑖=1  ≥ H ⁄ 2.                                              (47b) 
Rearranging left-hand side of (47b), we have 
∑ (1 − 𝜎𝑖)𝑏𝑖
𝑤𝑀
𝑖=1  + ∑ 𝑏𝑖
𝑑𝐿
𝑖=1  = ∑ 𝑏𝑖
𝑤𝑀
𝑖=1  – ∑ 𝜎𝑖𝑏𝑖
𝑤𝑀
𝑖=1  + ∑ 𝑏𝑖
𝑑𝐿
𝑖=1  = ∑ 𝑏𝑖
𝑤𝑀
𝑖=1  +  ∑ 𝑏𝑖
𝑑𝐿
𝑖=1  – ∑ 𝜎𝑖𝑏𝑖
𝑤𝑀
𝑖=1 = H –
∑ 𝜎𝑖𝑏𝑖
𝑤𝑀
𝑖=1  ≥ H ⁄ 2 that implies 
∑ 𝜎𝑖𝑏𝑖
𝑤𝑀
𝑖=1  ≤ H ⁄ 2.                                                           (47c) 
(47a) and (47c) together coincide with system (43). 
Analogously, in the 2nd case we receive system (42). 
In the 3rd case simple geometrical reasoning shows that the segment connecting points (T1(σ) + S1, 
T2(σ)) and (T1(σ), T2(σ) + S2) must intersect the rayon x = y. In the intersection point we receive that for 
some λ ∈ [0, 1] 
∑ 𝜎𝑖𝑎𝑖
𝑤𝑀
𝑖=1  + (1– 𝜆) S1 = ∑ (1 − 𝜎𝑖)𝑏𝑖
𝑤𝑀
𝑖=1  + λ S2. 
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Expressing λ from this equation and taking into account inequalities  λ ≥ 0, λ ≤ 1, after rearranging 
receive system (44). 
Statement 15. Problem a, b, SQ(S) (i.e. an equitable division exists) if and only if inequalities 
system (44) is compatible.  
Proof. See the 3rd case in the previous proof. 
To be useful, statements 14 and 15 must be completed with some efficient algorithms of compatibility 
checking for systems (42), (43) and (44). In order to find them consider the following optimization 
problems relatively Boolean variables σ1, …, σN: 


N
i
iib
1
 → max                                                              (48a) 
subject to  


N
i
iia
1
 ≤ H /2;                                                              (48b) 


N
i
iia
1
 → max                                                              (49a) 
subject to  


N
i
iib
1
 ≤ H /2;                                                               (49b) 


N
i
iiс
1
 → max                                                              (50a) 
subject to  


N
i
iic
1
 ≤ H.                                                                 (50b) 
The following statement is evident. 
Statement 16.  
System (42) is compatible if and only if the maximal value in problem (48) is not less than H /2. 
System (43) is compatible if and only if the maximal value in problem (49) is not less than H /2. 
System (44) is compatible if and only if the maximal value in problem (50) is not less than  H – (S1 + 
S2). 
Thus, statements  14 – 16 reduce checking existence of proportional and equitable division problem to 
optimization problems relatively Boolean variables σ1, …, σN . Namely: 
Problem (48) is a knapsack problem with item weights b1, …, bN , item values a1, …, aN and weight 
restriction H /2.  
Problem (49) is a knapsack problem with item weights a1, …, aN , item values b1, …, bN and weight 
restriction H /2.  
Problem (50) is a simplest knapsack problem, where values c1, …, cN coincide with weights and 
weight restriction is H. 
All the above mentioned knapsack problems can be efficiently solved by dynamic programming (see 
detail in section 4.1).  
 
6. Examples 
In this section we give some relatively simple examples that illustrate the results of sections 5 and 6. 
Example 4. Let us consider the following division problem with one divisible and four indivisible 
items (divisible items here and in next examples are at the beginning): 
                                Table 8 
A B 
1 1 
45 30 
30 25 
21 
 
15 22 
9 22 
100 100 
For this problem:  
system (42) is  





  5022222530
   509  153045
4321
4321


                                               (51)  
system (43) is 





  5022222530
   509  153045
4321
4321


                                               (52) 
c1 = 45+30 = 75, c2 = 30+25 = 55, c3 = 15+22 = 37, c3 = 9+22 = 31; 
system (44) is  





 9813  375575
10013  375575
4321
4321


                                               (53) 
In order to check compatibility of these three systems, consider the set of all the 16 Boolean vectors 
(σ1,σ2,σ3,σ4) and calculate the corresponding value of three expressions: 
V1 = 45σ1+30σ2+15σ3+9σ4, 
V2 = 30σ1+25σ2+22σ3+22σ4, 
V3 = 75σ1+55σ2+37σ3+31σ4 (V3 = V1+V2). 
Results of these simple calculations are presented in Table 9: 
                                                      Тable 9 
σ1 σ2 σ3 σ4 V1 V2 V3 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 9 22 31 
0 0 1 0 15 22 37 
0 0 1 1 24 44 68 
0 1 0 0 30 25 55 
0 1 0 1 39 47 86 
0 1 1 0 45 47 92 
0 1 1 1 54 69 123 
 
 
σ1 σ2 σ3 σ4 V1 V2 V3 
1 0 0 0 45 30 75 
1 0 0 1 54 52 102 
1 0 1 0 60 52 112 
1 0 1 1 69 74 143 
1 1 0 0 75 55 130 
1 1 0 1 84 77 161 
1 1 1 0 90 77 167 
1 1 1 1 99 99 198 
 
The compatibility of system (51) means that in some row of the table V1 ≤ 50, V2 ≥ 50; the compatibi- 
lity of system (52) means that in some row of the table V1 ≥ 50, V2 ≤ 50; the compatibility of system 
(53) means that in some row of the table 98 ≤ V3 ≤ 100. None of rows satisfies these conditions. Thus, 
in the considered case proportional division does not exist, that can be written in the form 
P(S)E(S)                                                                     (54) 
at least for S =1, 4, 100. 
Example 5. Let us consider the following division problem with one divisible and four indivisible 
items: 
                             Table 10 
A B 
3 3 
45 17 
30 20 
20 22 
2 38 
100 100 
In this case formulas (6) for gains are written as follows: 
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GA(x, σ) = xa0 + 

N
i
iia
1
 = 3x+45σ1+30σ2+20σ3+2σ4,                                      (55) 
GB(x, σ) = (1–x)b0 +  

N
i
ii b
1
)1(  = – xb0 = 3(1–x) +17(1–σ1) +20(1–σ2)+22(1–σ3)+ 38 (1–σ4).     (56) 
From (55) and (56) immediately 
GA(x, σ) = 3x + V1, 
GB(x, σ) = 3(1–x) + V2, 
GA(x, σ) – GB(x, σ) = (6x–3) + (V1 – V2), 
where  
V1 = 45σ1+30σ2+20σ3+2σ4, V2 = 17(1–σ1) +20(1–σ2)+22(1–σ3)+ 38 (1–σ4). 
Because 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, it is clear that existence of an equitable division implies that for some Boolean 
vector σ 
|V1 – V2 | ≤ 3. 
Assume V3 = 62σ1+50σ2+42σ3+40σ4; system (44) in the considered case becomes  
94 ≤ V3 ≤ 100. 
Let us consider the set of all the 16 Boolean vectors (σ1,σ2,σ3,σ4) and calculate the corresponding value of V1, V2 
and V3: 
                                                    Тable 11 
σ1 σ2 σ3 σ4 V1 V2 V3 
0 0 0 0 0 97 0 
0 0 0 1 2 59 40 
0 0 1 0 20 75 42 
0 0 1 1 22 37 82 
0 1 0 0 30 77 50 
0 1 0 1 32 39 90 
0 1 1 0 50 55 92 
0 1 1 1 52 17 132 
 
 
σ1 σ2 σ3 σ4 V1 V2 V3 
1 0 0 0 45 80 62 
1 0 0 1 47 42 102 
1 0 1 0 65 58 104 
1 0 1 1 67 20 144 
1 1 0 0 75 60 112 
1 1 0 1 77 22 152 
1 1 1 0 95 38 154 
1 1 1 1 97 0 184 
 
The compatibility of system (44) means that in some row of the table 94 ≤ V3 ≤ 100. None of rows 
satisfies this condition. Thus, by statement 11 in the considered case an equitable division does not 
exist. Indeed, for any row |V1 – V2 | > 3, and this difference cannot be compensate be one divisible item 
with value 3 for both participants. At the same time in several rows of the table (namely, 0110, 1010, 
1100) V1 ≥ 50, V2 ≥ 50 that means that proportional divisions exist. This example implies inclusion 
Q(S)P(S)                                                                       (57) 
at least for S =1, 4, 100. 
Example 6. Let us consider the following division problem with one divisible and four indivisible 
items: 
                              Тable 12 
A B 
5 5 
40 49 
10 1 
20 25 
25 20 
100 100 
In this case system we easily find equitable divisions  
{1, 2}, {0, 3, 4} and {0, 3, 4}, {1, 2}. 
In both cases each participant receives exactly 50; one of these divisions is a complement division for 
another. But this division is not efficient because division corresponding σ = (0,1,1,1): division {2, 3, 
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4} for A and {0, 1} for B gives more for both participants: (55, 54). Thus, this example implies 
inclusion 
F(S)Q(S)                                                                       (58) 
at least for at least for S =1, 4, 100. 
Summing inclusion (54), (57) and (58), we have 
F(S)Q(S)P(S)E(S) = U(S), 
in opposite to the case in which all items are divisible, where all the inclusions are equalities (see 
statement 2).  
Note, that the same inclusion is true for the problem from Example 3 with the other signature S = 2, 3, 
100. 
Example 7*. Let us consider the following division problem with one divisible and four indivisible 
items: 
                             Тable 13 
A B 
17 17 
42 45 
37 34 
2 2 
2 2 
100 100 
For this problem:  
system (42) is  





    50223445
   502 23742
4321
4321


                                                (59) 
system (43) is 





    50223445
   502 23742
4321
4321


                                                (60) 
c1 = 42+45 = 87, c2 = 37+34 = 71, c3 = 2 + 2 = 4, c4 = 2+2 = 41; 
system (44) is  





  664 47187
1004 47187
4321
4321


                                                  (61) 
In order to check compatibility of these three systems, consider the set of all the 16 Boolean vectors 
(σ1,σ2,σ3, σ4) and calculate the corresponding value of three expressions: 
V1 = 42σ1+37σ2+2σ3+2σ4, 
V2 = 45σ1+34σ2+2σ3+2σ4, 
V3 = 87σ1+71σ2+4σ3+4σ4 (V3 = V1+V2). 
Results of these simple calculations are presented in Table14: 
                                                   Тable 14 
σ1 σ2 σ3 σ4 V1 V2 V3 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 2 2 4 
0 0 1 0 2 2 4 
0 0 1 1 4 4 8 
0 1 0 0 37 34 71 
0 1 0 1 39 36 75 
0 1 1 0 39 36 75 
0 1 1 1 41 38 79 
 
 
σ1 σ2 σ3 σ4 V1 V2 V3 
1 0 0 0 42 45 87 
1 0 0 1 44 47 91 
1 0 1 0 44 47 91 
1 0 1 1 46 49 95 
1 1 0 0 79 79 158 
1 1 0 1 81 81 162 
1 1 1 0 81 81 162 
1 1 1 1 83 83 166 
 
*This example was suggested by SU – HSE student Alexander Shalenny 
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The compatibility of system (59) means that in some row of the table V1 ≤ 50, V2 ≥ 50; the 
compatibility of system (60) means that in some row of the table V1 ≥ 50, V2 ≤ 50; the compatibility 
of system (61) means that in some row of the table 66 ≤ V3 ≤ 100. None of rows satisfies first two 
conditions, though there are 8 rows satisfying (61). Thus, in the considered case equitably fair division 
exists: for instance, participant A receives item 3 (37%) and 14,5 of item 1 (14,5%), while participant 
B receives items 2, 4, 5 (49%) and 2,5 of item 1 (2,5%). Thus, everyone receives 51,5%;  no division 
gives more for both. Therefore, this is a fair division (it is simultaneously profitably, uniformly and 
equitably fair). 
Example 8. Let us consider the following division problem with three indivisible items: 
                             Тable 15 
A B 
51 40 
45 50 
4 10 
100 100 
In this problem point (GA(σ), (GB(σ)) is the pair of gains received by participants as a result of division  
σ, where 
GA(σ) = 51σ1+45σ2+4σ3, 
GB(σ) = 40(1–σ1)+50(1–σ2)+10(1–σ3). 
Let us calculate gains GA(σ), GB(σ) and expressions  
min{GA(σ), GB(σ)},                                                               (62) 
|GA(σ) – GB(σ)|                                                                 (63) 
for all 8 Boolean vectors (σ1,σ2,σ3) (see statement 7 and steps 11, 12 of the essential algorithm). The 
results of calculation are presented in Тable 16: 
                                                                                                  Тable 16 
σ1 σ2 σ3 GA(σ) GB(σ) min{GA(σ), GB(σ)} |GA(σ) – GB(σ)| 
0 0 0 0 100 0 100 
0 0 1 4 90 4 86 
0 1 0 45 50 45 5 
0 1 1 49 40 40 9 
1 0 0 51 60 51 9 
1 0 1 55 50 50 5 
1 1 0 96 10 10 86 
1 1 1 100 0 0 100 
Table 16 clear demonstrates that criteria (62) and (63) defining profitable and uniform fairness lead to 
different divisions. There are only two rows (5th and 6th) presenting proportional divisions. One of 
them maximizes (62) while the other minimizes (63) over the set of all the efficient divisions.   
 
7. Manipulation in the divisible case 
Usually, presentation of false data – false importance values in this case –  in order to receive more is 
called manipulation. The well known manipulation problem is considered in the following game form. 
1. Players independently choose arbitrary integer coefficients  a1, …, aN  and b1, …, bN  that are 
consider as their values of items.  
2. A fair division x, σ is constructed based on the presented values a = (a1, …, aN) and b = (b1, …, 
bN). 
3. The gain of player A is equal to value of division x, σ from the point of view of his true valuations 
𝑎𝑖
𝑡, …,  𝑎𝑁
𝑡     (analogously for player B). Formally 
GA(a, b) = ∑ 𝜎𝑖𝑎𝑖
𝑡𝑀
𝑖=1  + ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑎𝑖
𝑡𝐿
𝑖=1 ,                                                (64a) 
GB(a, b) = ∑ (1 − 𝜎𝑖)𝑏𝑖
𝑡𝑀
𝑖=1  + ∑ (1 − 𝑥𝑖)𝑏𝑖
𝑡𝐿
𝑖=1 ,                                    (64b) 
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where x, σ is a fair division corresponding to the presented values a and b (not to the true values at 
and bt). 
Thus, the game of two persons with finite number of strategies is defined. Remember, that strategy a* 
of player A is a guarantying strategy, if the minimal gain of this strategy is the maximal one, or 
min
𝑏
𝐺𝐴(𝑎
∗, 𝑏) ≥  min
𝑏
𝐺𝐴(𝑎, 𝑏) 
(analogously for player B:                                                                             
min
𝑎
𝐺𝐵(𝑎, 𝑏
∗) ≥  min
𝑎
𝐺𝐵(𝑎, 𝑏)). 
If guarantying strategy a* differs from true strategy at, that means that manipulation (i.e. presentation 
of strategy a* instead true strategy at) is profitable for player A; otherwise, manipulation can decrease 
the gain of the player (the same for player B). 
Statement 17. In the considered case a* = at, b* = bt, i.e. manipulation can decrease the gains. 
Proof. Suppose that a* ≠ at. If player B chooses strategy at of player A, then player B receives more 
than a half in values at (see Statement 2). Hence, player A receives less than a half in his own values at 
(see (64)). At the same time, if player A chooses his true strategy at, then he receives at least half in his 
own values at  independently of any choice of B. Therefore, strategy at, is the guarantying strategy of 
A (analogously for B). 
 
8. Conclusion 
In the connection with the presented material two typical questions arise: 
 How to modified the results to the case of N participants, where N > 2? 
 How to cope with manipulation in general case? 
These questions, as well as some others, are out of scope of this material. However, the author intends 
to continue investigation in this wide domain. Particularly, it seems of expedient to consider division 
problems in which some groups of items may be of special interest for participants, so that value of a 
group significantly exceeds the sum of values of its separate items (package deals). 
The author is grateful to his colleagues F.T. Aleskerov and D.A. Shwarts for their support and 
attention to this work. 
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